Imagined Entrepreneurs in Neoliberal South Africa: Informality and Spatial Justice in Post-Apartheid Cities

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**ABSTRACT** Despite a comparatively stable political situation and economic growth, South Africa has faced a number of challenges that have polarised society since democratisation in the early 1990s. Although one cannot ignore South Africa’s history of apartheid and its negative legacy, wealth and resources have not been distributed appropriately, due to the neoliberalisation of South Africa. In neoliberal projects, people are required to become entrepreneurs, who take responsibility for their own welfare. Although the government has promoted entrepreneurship and self-help, this strategy entails many difficulties when you consider the reality of South African society. Indeed, I assume that this initiative would generate only “imagined entrepreneurs”. Unsurprisingly, people who engage in informal economic activities are one of the most affected groups in this situation. Although the size of the informal economy of South Africa is comparatively small, recent growth in the informal economy has been remarkable in the form of traders as well as informal workers within the formal sector. However, people working in informal conditions are often eliminated from new urban spaces that are being shaped in commercially-oriented forms. This paper concludes that by seeking “the right to the city” (David Harvey) and “spatial justice” (Edward W. Soja), there can be some hope for people who currently struggle to acquire living spaces in South Africa. [economic anthropology, geographical thought, neoliberalism, informal economy, right to the city]

**INTRODUCTION: “DEMOCRATISATION” UNDER NEOLIBERALISM**

When the end of apartheid and the shift toward democratisation occurred in South Africa in the early 1990s, the world economy was already in a post-fordism or neoliberalism transition. Thus, South Africa followed the path of neoliberalisation (Hart 2002:20-21; 2008; Marais 2011:99-107). Although the South African economy grew rapidly in the first decade of the 2000s, only 1.7 million new jobs were created and a large percentage of these were casual, temporary and low-paid (Marais 2011:151). In South Africa today, one can easily find any number of instances of neoliberal rationalities of rule: the proliferation of NGOs; the “responsibilisation” of education, health care and local government; privatised forms of security, and many other examples of extensions of market models into realms that were heavily bureaucratised under much of the apartheid rule (Hart 2008:689). In advanced liberal or neoliberal projects, all South Africans are now required to become entrepreneurs and are forced to take responsibility for their own welfare. Nicholas Rose (1999:141-142) notes that in developing an advanced liberal diagram, all aspects of social behaviour are reconceptualised along economic lines. Indeed, post-apartheid South African society demands that people pursue mentalities that are similar to those of gold rush migrants in terms of a “get-quick-rich mentality” or a “winner-take-all ethos”. The BEE millionaires or Tenderpreneurs have benefited from white capital during the “democratisation” of the South African economy under the neoliberal order.¹ Moeletsi Mbeki (2009:95) argues that in the modern liberal capitalist society of South Africa, the one missing factor is support for entrepreneurship from both the politically dominant black elite and the dominant economic elite, who receive protection from domestic and foreign competition by the political elite in return for reparations. The uneven distribution of benefits during the period of expansive economic development and a lack of adequate entrepreneurial opportunities characterises South African society.²

Under neoliberal individualism and the principle of self-responsibility, we need to be reminded that neoliberalism is the massive, naked application of state power in order to raise rates of profit for crony groups (Davis and Monk 2007:x). In this context, the state and capital become more tightly intertwined than ever, both institutionally and personally (Harvey 2010:219). Accordingly, it is no wonder that there are increasing concerns about the “underclass”, categorised as useless, and a segment of society that has become detached from, and is irrelevant to, the bulimic society, where massive cultural inclusion is accompanied by systematic structural exclusion (Young 2007:29-32).³ In fact, in South Africa, only 1 million people are part of the vibrant formal sector of economic life. A further 12.8 million live lower to higher middle class lives, while 33.3 million are dependent on a spouse, the government, non-government organisations, friends or non-spousal family to survive (BMR 2008).⁴ Increasing poverty, social polarisation and the frustration of
people in a bulimic society, which occasionally engenders extreme violence against others, need to be recognised as the reality of South Africa, and we need to help those 33.3 million people on the lowest rung to acquire living spaces.

RESTRICTING URBAN SPACES AND SPATIAL JUSTICE
As we have seen, post-apartheid South African society has been transformed by neoliberal projects. Therefore, it follows that cityscapes are dominated by office developments and shopping emporiums, as well as by convention and entertainment centres. More than ever before in its history, Johannesburg’s city space is a product that is marked, measured, marketed and transacted (Mbembe 2008:54). Johannesburg has been restructured by a vast but uneven wave of property speculation; the city appears unable to break from its inherited built environment because of the speculative character of South African capital accumulation, or the neoliberal dogma of its rulers (Bond 2007:116). In Johannesburg today, one can witness the rapid consolidation of a new system of separation (Beavon 2000) through the process of suburbanisation (Mabin 2005). Due to deteriorating conditions of public safety, fortress-like gated communities have redrawn the geography of cities and towns (Marais 2011:230). This clearly shows that urban spaces in post-apartheid South Africa are formed of actual products that are indicated by “postmodern geographies” (Soja 1989).

“Pure space”, presented as relatively purified, homogenous and controlled environments with spaces where people can walk freely (Low 2003:143), is desperately needed for many South Africans. Indeed, Lemanski (2004:110) has pointed out three key similarities between the apartheid and post-apartheid city: first, the use of fear to justify exclusion; second, the use of spatial mechanisms to displace social problems; and third, the dominance of social and symbolic exclusion. It is safe to say that the new racial or more class-based segregations reflect the total urban spatial re-imagination. Under such conditions, people who engage in informal economic activities are being eliminated from new urban spaces, which are treated as a commodity in South Africa.

Since Keith Hart (1973) highlighted the significance of irregular economic activities by urban dwellers in Accra, and ILO (1972) coined the concept of the informal sector, the idea of an informal economy has been used to describe actual economic conditions in the developing world that escape state regulation (Hart 2010). Although it is difficult to define the informal economy, it is often said that the size of the informal economy in South Africa is relatively small in the context of statistics produced by Statistics South Africa. This is because the development of the informal economy in South Africa has been closely tied to the politics of apartheid in that most informal sales in urban centres were defined as illegal under apartheid. Even in post-apartheid South Africa, the concept of the informal economy is still often confused with illegal activity (ILO 2002:40). However, although the formal economy accounts for the majority of employment in South Africa, the informal economy has shown a recent marked increase, doubling from 0.97 million people in 1997 to 1.9 million people in 2003 (Devey et al. 2006:231).

Currently, the informal economy can also be found inside formal enterprises through the rapid growth of casual and sub-contracted work (Webster et al. 2008). It is obvious that formal and informal activities are often thoroughly interdependent, supplementing or subsidising one another in complex ways (Du Toit and Neves 2007). Under a neoliberal imperative to reduce the state’s grip on “the free market”, national economies and the world economy itself have been radically de-formalised (Han and Hart 2011:115). If this has occurred, we need to be reminded of Mike Davis’ criticisms regarding “myths of informal economy” (2007:180-185) and we also need to recapture the informal economy in a broader sense. In this paper, although I do not define the term, I use informality as a term that includes people who engage in informal economic activities, are unemployed, are struggling under severe living conditions (even if they are identified as workers in the formal sector) and so on. In any case, we are becoming aware that contests between informality and the restructuring of urban spaces are becoming increasingly common problems in post-apartheid cities.

David Harvey’s (2008; 2012) concept of the “right to the city” and Edward W. Soja’s (2010) “spatial justice” need to be examined in detail now. The idea of the right to the city was originally developed by Henri Lefebvre in the late 1960s. It was a stirring call to everyone who is disadvantaged by the conditions of urban life under capitalism to rise up and take greater control over how the unjust urban spaces in which they live are socially controlled (Soja 2010:83). Seeking the right to the city is a continuous and more radical effort for spatial re-appropriation, and involves taking an active presence in all that takes place in urban life under capitalism (Soja 2010:96).

Harvey (2008:23) has recently revived the right to the city as one of the human rights that must be encouraged in the new century: “The question of what kind of city we want cannot be divorced from that of what kind of social ties, relationship to nature, lifestyles, technologies and aesthetic values we desire. The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is the right to change ourselves by changing the city. The freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights.”

Similarly, Soja (2010:6) illuminates a concept of spatial justice that promotes more progressive and participatory forms
of democratic politics and social activism, and provides new ideas about how to mobilise and maintain cohesive coalitions and regional confederations of grassroots and justice-oriented movements. Soja’s (2010:95) conclusion is that the two concepts, spatial justice and the right to the city, have become so interwoven in their contemporary usage that they have become increasingly difficult to tell apart. I agree that there are similarities between the two concepts because they share the common goal of seeking to recapture living spaces for people who are struggling under uneven development. I also think that the idea of spatial justice provides more in the way of comprehensive strategies for claiming living spaces, not only in cities but also in rural areas. Furthermore, I think that these philosophical and practical movements will be required to ensure “greater democratic control over the production and utilisation of the surplus” (Harvey 2008:37).6

It may be helpful to consider some important factors associated with conflicts over urban spaces and movements that seek spatial justice in post-apartheid South African cities. I will use case studies in the following sections. I selected two cases in Durban and Johannesburg, in particular, because both cities represent South Africa’s mega cities in terms of population and cultural diversity, and both function as economic hubs. You can find neoliberal urban projects around every corner in both cities. The two cases include different types of movements in terms of size, style, motivation and targets. By discussing cases that involve very different styles of movement, broad conclusions about the possibilities of seeking spatial justice can be drawn. The following two cases are only examples of similar movements that have recently emerged throughout South Africa. It is meaningful to try to explain the recent movements and tensions in South Africa in relation to the concept of spatial justice; this will help identify the issues in an easily understandable way.

**INFORMAL TRADERS AND NEOLIBERAL GENTRIFICATION IN DURBAN**

Warwick Junction in Durban CBD attracts 8,000 street traders that sell their goods and services to 460,000 pedestrians per day who arrive and depart from the main railway station, five bus terminals and nineteen taxi ranks. Many stalls and markets sell fresh vegetables and fruits, meats, prepared foods, mealies, clays, clothes, music CDs and DVDs, and traditional medicines and provide services such as barbering, sewing and shoe repair. The famous Early Morning Market also attracts many traders and customers (Dobson et al. 2009:5-7).

The history of Warwick is summarised as follows (Attwood 2009; Dobson et al. 2009; Skinner 2009). In 1872, Indian people started markets in the Warwick area and rural African people moved to the city to set up trading sites by the 1930s. In July 1930, the town allocated £15,000 for a proper enclosure for the Warwick Street traders; the Early Morning Market, comprising 618 stalls, opened on January 31, 1934. However, by the 1960s, street trading had been prohibited in Durban and traders were harshly punished and evicted if found in the city. By the early 1990s, national laws that restricted black economic activity were relaxed and thousands of people moved into the city looking for work or to trade informally where business was favourable and pavement space was available. Since the democratisation of South Africa, the local government has begun work to improve trading conditions for street traders. For example, the city’s health department established health and safety awareness training to introduce minimum health requirements. They also compiled a preliminary database of street traders, detailing their activities and documenting what infrastructure they wanted. Street traders also started to become better organised. In 1994, the Self Employed Women’s Union was launched and the Informal Traders Management Board was set up in 1995 to represent trader organisations and to serve as an umbrella body with which the council could negotiate.

In 1995, a project to redevelop the deteriorated Warwick area started officially. The council set aside R4.72 million and the European Commission committed to contribute 11% of the municipality’s total allocation to the project. The Project Centre provided meeting spaces for project staff, department officials, traders’ organisations and residents. Vast spaces in Warwick Junction were modified and improved by this project. Thus, the area was the site of a collaborative planning process that, within a few years, became widely recognised as a model of sensitive integration of street traders into urban plans. Peter Robinson, a professor at the School of Architecture, Planning and Housing, University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, and Richard Dobson, an architect, praised the project: “Creativity in the design of urban spaces is not confined to forms of large squares and boulevards, up-market residential developments, or shopping malls and office parks, but can occur in poor areas of a city, and often in small spaces. The evidence from Warwick Junction shows how different groups in the city have used the spaces in and around disused infrastructure to set up a number of informal economic activities. Furthermore, this case study offers a model for urban managers faced with the dilemma of whether to exclude or to work with the informal sector. The experience of Warwick Junction stands in stark contrast to how the informal economy is approached by most local authorities; the approach developed through the project is a model of what is possible in developing country cities.”

However, in February 2009, the eThekwini (Durban) Municipality suddenly announced that they were prepared to demolish the Early Morning Market and to replace it with a shopping mall, threatening the livelihoods of 6,000 informal traders. The development included road and freeway
realignments, a more logical positioning of taxi ranks, and the creation of a mall with banking and retail facilities. The traders from the Early Morning Market, who were being moved to premises that were about 300 m away, were concerned that they would miss out on passing trade from buses, taxis and trains that would inevitably be attracted to the mall (Inggs 2009). In June 2009, chaos broke out at the site when the Metro Police barred access to the market and five people were injured by rubber bullets. The traders were granted a Durban High Court order forcing the municipality to allow them to enter the market and continue trading. The eThekwini Municipality was accused of defying a court order permitting traders access to the market (Ndlovu 2009).

This public-private urban restructuring plan was bombarded with criticism by various social sectors, including NGOs, architects and academics who claimed that the municipality had not followed legal and public processes (Comins 2009). For instance, Miles Pennington, the president of the KwaZulu-Natal Institute of Architects noted, in criticism, that, “The city intends leasing a very important commercial site in Durban’s Warwick Junction to a private developer, evicting hundreds of street traders at very short notice. No urban planning, no analysis of precedent, no traders, no informal economy” (Sole 2009). Keith Hart also responded: “I am a democrat and I can’t sit silent while one of the world’s most successful attempts to bring formal and informal organisation together for the common good has been so wilfully assaulted. It is as if the democratic example set by Warwick traders and enlightened local bureaucracy was such an affront to some of Durban’s rich and powerful individuals that they had to smash it.” The South African Communist Party was alarmed: “The whole project has been riddled by a lack of open and transparent dialogue and consultation” (Tolsi 2009), and the Inkatha Freedom Party reacted to reports that Metro Police used rubber bullets on traders: “The manner in which the eThekwini Municipality dealt with the traders is reminiscent of the way the apartheid government used to deal with the black communities and their opponents” (Madlala 2009). Harry Ramlall, the chairman of the Early Morning Market Traders’ Association, said that, “Traders are being relocated to an unknown materials management building that has been standing vacant for 30 years and was not designed for business” (Inggs 2009). Finally, it is important to include the opinions of traders who strongly called for the right to live in the space: “We are not going anywhere”; “It’s our life at stake. We’re not going into any marquee”; “A mall is for rich people. We are the poor”; “How would the city councillors and developers feel in our position?” and, “When we tried to have a sit-in last week they used pepper spray on us. We have human rights; we are not criminals” (Attwood 2009).

On the other hand, the eThekwini Municipality and the developer believed that the project would improve the circumstances of traders. Carlos Correia, the chief executive of Isolenu, the developer of the mall, said that registered street traders would be provided with lock-up facilities for their goods. They would have covered trading sites, proper delivery areas and ablution facilities at no extra cost. Mayor Obed Mlaba said that the project was an opportunity to centralise the city’s transport facilities and to create one hub. Philip Sithole, the head of the business support and markets unit at the eThekwini Municipality, said that the main aim of the project was to reconfigure roads in the area to deal with the large volumes of traffic (Inggs 2009). The African National Congress (ANC) also supported the project: “We believe that it will boost the economic developments of eThekwini and the economic viability of the informal trading industry as they have been accommodated in the developmental projects.” Mike Sutcliffe, the eThekwini Municipal manager, said he found that the 460,000 commuters who move through the area every day “overwhelmingly indicated” that they “wanted more choice” when shopping there; hence, a proposed franchise-ridden mall (Tolsi 2009). He also said that vendors at the market owed the city R20 million in rental arrears: “It’s been very problematic. In the end, this market is not viable.” From his comment, we can divine the real intention of the municipality: they want to reconfigure the urban space so that it becomes more profitable. Philip Sithole at the eThekwini Municipality provided another point of view. He saw the construction of the regional taxi rank and shopping mall on the market site as a necessary evil in the name of “public safety”: “Heritage and history is very important but in our view it is not as important as public safety.” He added, “People are under the impression that we are out to destroy the market. We are not. The proposed development on the market site is part of a greater Warwick project. We want to rejuvenate the area and make Durban an efficient transport city” (Saib 2010).

The project mentioned above clearly represents “neoliberal gentrification”; Skinner (2009) concluded that the project was driven by private property interests combined with a city that conformed with modernist notions of “cityness” ahead of the 2010 Soccer World Cup. This case also implies that ideas of “the entrepreneurialism of urban governance” (Harvey 1989), “gentrification as global urban strategy” (Smith 2002) and “the development of global cities in the South” (Lemanski 2007) are becoming important issues in post-apartheid South Africa. Even though after the Soccer World Cup in 2010 the development company and the municipality were still prepared to go ahead with the Warwick Mall project,12 in April 2011 the project was eventually halted because of various legal wrangles over the property that was the site of the city’s Early Morning Market.13 I have no insights into the internal facts that blocked this project. In any event, we need to be vigilant in looking out

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for this kind of development.

**SEEKING SPATIAL JUSTICE BY ARTISTS AND TRADERS IN JOHANNESBURG**

The centre of Johannesburg currently attracts many foreign immigrants and temporary visitors from neighbouring countries. In immigrant rich Yeoville, the local market reflects the strong Congolese presence through foodstuffs like *fufu*, cassava leaves and dried fish from the Congo River. The visitors shop here and take the goods back to their countries. Informal cross-border trade is a booming business for everyone in the city. It is apparent that Johannesburg is an informal trade hub of the SADC region (Keepile and Kadida 2009).

Joubert Park in downtown Johannesburg has important mini bus taxi hubs. There are large numbers of motor spares shops that specialise in cheap taxi spares and a diverse range of informal motor-related services, which are offered predominantly by Mozambican motor mechanics. Zulu women cook traditional Mozambican food on street corners to cater to the large number of Mozambican mechanics working in the area. At every intersection, men approach taxi drivers selling cigarettes and sweets. Outside the taxi ranks, groups of Zimbabwean and Mozambican luggage porters (trolley pushers) wait for customers that require luggage-carrying assistance (Farouk 2010:234-235).

However, the authorities have often tried to reshape the scene described above. For instance, just after the new government was established, harassment of street traders by police was frequently reported by street traders in Yeoville, who were fined for violating the Traffic Control Law (Simmonds 1998). Although the traders were eventually allowed to stay on the street, the City of Johannesburg also tried to force street traders to move into a permanent market. A city official said, “We want to see traders where they will be able to run their businesses professionally and uplift these from micro to medium enterprises,” while a secretary of the Hillbrow-Berea Hawkers’ Association said, “Moving people into markets is ridiculous because we rely on passing trade” (Simmonds 2000).

In Joubert Park, a major problem associated with trolley-pushing has been that of victimisation by police; raids have been occurring with increasing frequency and trolley pushers are being detained in prison for seemingly harmless economic activity (Farouk 2010:237). A recent protest action against the criminalisation of trolley-pushing in Joubert Park demonstrated that the trolley pushers are united in their struggle against police harassment. During the protest, they addressed members of the police force and highlighted the fact that they were creating jobs and were not criminals (Farouk 2010:241).

In addition to the authorities, politically affiliated youths have attacked informal traders. Thami Mazwai (2011), the director of the Centre for Small Business Development, University of Johannesburg, was worried by a series of incidents in which ANC youth league members vandalised informal trading stands in the Johannesburg inner city and striking members of the National Union of Metalworkers of SA raided street hawkers, overturning their carts: “The irony is that the informal traders are now victimised by youths shouting ‘economic freedom’ or workers on strike for a ‘living wage’. What ‘economic freedom’ is it when the youths do not allow ordinary people the freedom to trade? What ‘living wage’ are we talking of, when the strikers do not allow others the right to a living?”

The chain of events mentioned above clearly shows that the city’s regeneration plans have disregarded migrants and informal traders, who are not considered part of the desired future in the re-imagining of the city (Farouk 2010:236). Here, I introduce an example outlining the desire for spatial justice; it is called “Trolley Works”, which is a new multidisciplinary urban intervention project and exhibition that was organised by an artist and urban geographer, Ismail Farouk. The project sought practical ways to regulate and legalise trolley pushing in Joubert Park and its surrounds. Trolley-pushers are urban porters who use recycled supermarket trolleys to carry heavy loads of luggage around the city for a small fee. Because their trolleys, often rented from unforgiving “trolley lords”, are essentially stolen, the police have a field day impounding them and fining or locking up their drivers (Buys 2009).14

According to Farouk (2010:236), the objective of the Trolley Works project was “to develop a comprehensive profile of the informal trolley pushers and related economic activities in the greater Joubert Park area. By mapping the informal economic activities and the organically generated diversity, the project aims to bring about awareness of the potential role of migrant-controlled business in contributing towards the economic and cultural regeneration of the inner city of Johannesburg.”

Farouk, artist Rob Peers and their team of trolley-pushing collaborators have come up with a design for a bespoke steel porting trolley to replace the plastic supermarket trolleys (Buys 2009). In addition to designing these custom-built trolleys to help legalise the activity, the project also seeks to develop trolley pusher-led guided tours of the downtown area (Farouk 2010:237). Farouk said on his project blog: “We hope to expose people to the urban contradictions present in the city and are attempting to address the need to walk in the downtown area of Johannesburg. Walking in Johannesburg is strongly linked to class, race, crime, fear and paranoia” (Buys 2009). The first phase of the Trolley Works project began in December 2008 and it was planned to run until May 2009 (Farouk 2010:241). I would like to emphasise the importance of this kind of movement as constituting activities aimed at achieving some...
degree of spatial justice. This has the potential to become a strategy that must be repeated throughout South African urban spaces.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The changes and activities that are happening in Durban and Johannesburg clearly show that authorities eager to formalise and “purify” urban spaces using awareness of “public safety” or “security” are hiding their true intentions of entrepreneurship with regard to urban governance. At the same time, the government has repeatedly promoted the importance of entrepreneurship and self-help in policy papers, while advertisements have also redefined democracy as individual freedom, especially freedom to consume (Hart 2002:25). Inevitably, people have dreamed of succeeding as entrepreneurs in a bulimic society. However, the reality is that politically connected entrepreneurs, who are neatly protected, have all the power and ordinary citizens are generally abandoned. As Gillian Hart (2002:25) complains: “You can find that huge numbers of South African are excluded not only from the world of BMWs, but also some of the most basic means of material existence.” In a society of uneven development, unequal redistribution of resources and inequality of opportunities for participating in economic activities, we can say that South Africans are wandering in a labyrinth, seeking to realise identities linked to the idea of “imagined entrepreneurs”, a concept unsupported by material conditions.

As we have seen, many people are struggling to acquire the right to their living spaces. Yet, we have also seen that informal traders together with social organisations have been seeking spatial justice in new urban spaces. I have tried to set out empirical and theoretical analyses of spatial justice, focusing on the informality of post-apartheid cities, in this paper. The two case studies that were presented involved totally different movements in terms of their size, impact and outcomes. However, in both cases, it is safe to say that the aim of spatial justice involved people striving to recapture living spaces, as opposed to being tied to formal movements, such as organised labour movements by/for stakeholders. The drive for spatial justice should not be limited to movements for/ by the poor but should be included in efforts for/by all users of urban spaces. The second case study, in particular, which included artists and traders, showed that movements should try to appeal to anyone who has a misguided sense of what urban space should involve. Although each movement makes a small contribution, it is possible to change people’s mindsets and to create new types of movements. Such movements might be able to bring hope to people living in conditions of instability and informality, who are desperate to survive and who are material, not imagined, entrepreneurs. I do not want to deify informal entrepreneurs. I want the drive for spatial justice to be recognised as a practical and philosophical tool by which people can acquire living spaces and achieve true democratisation in post-apartheid South Africa.

NOTES

1. The term, tenderpreneur (tender-entrepreneur) has been remarkably popular in South African political scenes recently, being used to describe political corruption or “grey” transactions in the government’s tendering processes. The Star describes a tenderpreneur as “someone politically well-connected who has got rich through the government tendering system” (“How Malema made his millions” The Star, February 21, 2010).

2. According to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) survey in 2008, the Total Early-stage Entrepreneurial Activity index (TEA), which is the principle measure of entrepreneurial activity, of South Africa ranked 23rd (TEA rates: 7.8%) out of 43 countries. In South Africa, entrepreneurial activities are hindered by a poor skills base as well as by severe environmental limitations, including poverty, a lack of active markets and poor access to resources. Therefore, many South Africans do not regard entrepreneurship as a positive and viable choice (Herrington et al. 2009:15-16).

3. The contrast between a bulimic society and an exclusive society can be seen if one compares Western liberal democracies (and perhaps the new South Africa) with an explicitly exclusive society, the South Africa of Hendrik Verwoerd and P.W. Botha. The latter had explicit spatial and social exclusion, a multi-culturalist apartheid based on racist distinctions, and a controlled mass media that refused to report police brutality and that extolled divisions. It was both culturally and structurally exclusivist (Young 2007:33).

4. The criterion for classification is based on the “2006 income break down for the total population by income category” by BMR: The group earning R0-12,200 consists of 33,329,055 people; R12,201-48,700 consists of 8,947,969 people; R48,701-194,700 consists of 3,909,666 people; R194,701-779,900 consists of 885,862; R779,901 or more consists of 177,447 people (BMR 2008).

5. Mike Davis (2007:179) criticised the “myth of the informal economy” represented by Hernando de Soto’s popular simple recipe: get the state (and formal-sector labour unions) out of the way, add micro-credit for micro-entrepreneurs and land titling for squatters, then let markets take their course to produce the transubstantiation of poverty into capital.

6. Harvey (2008:37) sees that urbanisation has played a crucial role in the absorption of capital surpluses, at ever increasing geographical scales, but at the price of burgeoning processes of creative destruction that have dispossessed the masses of any right to the city whatsoever.


14. Theft of supermarket trolleys is a highly organised business. The trolleys are supplied by gangs made up of Zimbabwean youth, who use hired trucks and vans to transport stolen trolleys from shopping centres to the downtown area where they are sold on the streets. The trolley pushers are not directly responsible for the theft of trolleys. However, everyone is aware of the points for stolen trolleys in the area. During quiet periods, stolen trolleys are sold for as little as R50, whilst they can sell for as much as R200 during busy periods (Farouk 2010:239).
15. For example, the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGISA), a government’s economic policy paper published in 2006, mentioned the promotion of entrepreneurs: “There are several interventions designed to support to small businesses. The government is supporting efforts to establish new venture funds for small, medium and micro enterprises.”

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